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Russian sanctions against Moldova 
Minor effects, major potential 
Kamil Całus
Russia has been Moldova’s main trade partner and Russian capital has accounted for a large 
part of its foreign investments, dominating in the energy and the banking sectors. Moreover, 
Russia has been a key job market for Moldovan expatriate workers. In the economic sphere, 
this is making Moldova unilaterally dependent on Russia. Moscow has been attempting to 
exploit this situation to put pressure on the authorities in Chișinău for quite some time.
In recent months Russia has increasingly used instruments for exerting economic pressure on 
Moldova, as a means of responding to the current authorities’ pro-Western policy. A key ele-
ment of this policy was Moldova’s signing on 27 June 2014 of the Association Agreement with 
the EU (which came into force on 1 September 2014). Over the last year, Russia has implemen-
ted a number of import restrictions on Moldovan goods. The aim of the Russian actions is to 
fuel social disappointment, and ultimately – to prevent the pro-European coalition currently 
in power from winning the parliamentary elections scheduled for 30 November 2014. Another 
aim might be to convince the Moldovan authorities to suspend the implementation of the 
Association Agreement – a plan openly put forward by Vladimir Putin during the CIS summit 
in Minsk on 10 October 2014.
So far, however, the Russian economic sanctions have failed to produce the expected results. 
Support for the pro-European parties has been high, and there is little chance that the pro-Rus-
sian groups might achieve a parliamentary majority. It is not inconceivable, then, that in the up-
coming months Moscow might decide to resort to other, more potent instruments of economic 
pressure such as speculation on the financial market, carried out as part of its de facto control 
over the banking sector. Another possibility is further tightening of trade restrictions, issuing 
expatriate workers from Russia or using Moldova’s dependence on Russian energy. 
Russian influence 
in the Moldovan economy
Russia is Moldova’s largest foreign investor. 
In 2012 the total amount of Russian capi-
tal invested in Moldova stood at 786 million 
US dollars, which accounted for 23% of all fo-
reign investment in that country. The actual 
share of Russian capital is considerably larger. 
A large proportion of funds invested in Mol-
dova is being managed indirectly by Russian 
companies registered in tax havens, mainly in 
Cyprus which, according to official statistics, 
is the second largest investor in the Moldovan 
economy (553 million US dollars in 2012). The 
bulk of Russian funds have been invested in the 
fuel, banking, transport and mass media sec-
tors. Russia also plays a major role in Moldova’s 
trade exchange and is the main destination for 
Moldovan expatriate workers.
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Trade 
Russia is Moldova’s largest trade partner. In 
2013 it accounted for 26% of Moldovan exports 
and 14% of its imports. It is also the recipient 
of the majority of Moldovan fruit exports 
(60–70%), including nearly 100% of Moldovan 
apples, and a key consumer of Moldovan fru-
it and vegetable preserves. Until the introduc-
tion of the embargo on alcohol in September 
2013, Russia had also been the largest market 
for Moldovan wine (purchasing ca. 30% of the 
total wine production). 
In September 2013 Russia introduced a ban on 
the imports of Moldovan alcoholic beverages 
and, in April 2014, a similar ban on processed 
pork. In July 2014 the embargo was expanded to 
include Moldovan fruit and canned vegetables, 
and on 27 October 2014 Russia fully suspended 
the imports of Moldovan meat. Apart from the 
embargo, as of 1 September 2014 Russia unilate-
rally introduced import duties on 19 categories of 
Moldovan goods, thereby violating the provisions 
of the free trade agreement within the CIS1. The-
se 19 product categories were previously subject 
to zero rate customs duty within this area2. The 
above-mentioned trade restrictions have contri-
buted to a considerable decrease in Russia’s share 
in Moldovan export figures. In the first 8 months 
of 2014 Russia’s share in Moldovan trade figures 
fell by a quarter. Currently, Russia’s share in total 
Moldovan exports is 20.5%, compared with 28% 
in the corresponding period last year. 
Although Russian sanctions are having a ne-
gative impact on the situation in individual 
sectors, they have not resulted in far-reaching 
consequences for the entire Moldovan econo-
my. This is against the Kremlin’s intentions and 
the announcements made by the pro-Russian 
1 http://expert-grup.org/ro/comentarii/item/1000-taxe-
zero-rusia/1000-taxe-zero-rusia
2 Russia’s lifting of zero rates concerns mainly those prod-
uct categories whose imports were previously banned, 
as well as wheat, furniture etc. Therefore, it is current-
ly difficult to predict the possible impact of these tariff 
changes on the Moldovan economy.
opposition in Moldova. According to estimates, 
losses associated with Russia’s actions are likely 
to amount to ca. 145 million US dollars over 
a one year period3, accounting for nearly 5% of 
the entire export value. The embargo has been 
most harmful to wine producers who, despite 
attempts made since the introduction of the 
sanctions in September 2013, have so far been 
unable to find an alternative to the Russian 
market. As a consequence, over a single year 
(from September 2013 till September 2014) the 
exports of alcoholic beverages from Moldova 
fell by 78 million US dollars, which accounts for 
ca. 30% of the country’s entire alcohol produc-
tion4. Some producers have managed to balan-
ce the effects of the embargo, for example by 
exporting wine to Russia via Abkhazia. The Ab-
khazian producers purchase large amounts of 
Moldovan wine, mix it with its own production 
and sell it on the Russian market. According to 
data compiled by the National Statistics Bure-
au, during the first half of 2014 Moldova expor-
ted nearly 11% of its wine production to Geor-
gia5. Smaller amounts of wine are also exported 
to Russia via Belarus (in Q1 2014 there was 
a 9% increase in the exports of wine to Belarus). 
The sanctions have been much less harmful for 
the fruit farming sector, which has been subject 
3 http: //www.get-moldova.de /download/Newslet-
ter/2014/Newsletter%2024%20GET%20Moldova.pdf
4 http://newsmaker.md/rus/novosti/gradus-snizilsya-do-30
5 Moldova has not recognised the independence of Ab-
khazia, therefore exports to this region have been in-
cluded in the total export figures relating to Georgia.
Although Russian sanctions are having 
a negative impact on the situation in indi-
vidual sectors, they have not resulted in 
far-reaching consequences for the entire 
Moldovan economy. This is against the 
Kremlin’s intentions and the announce-
ments made by the pro-Russian opposi-
tion in Moldova.
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to the embargo since July 2014. According to 
statements by the producers, most of Moldo-
van apples are still sold in the Russian market, 
just as they were before the embargo. This has 
been possible thanks to Belarusian intermedia-
ries who issue Belarusian certificates of origin 
for Moldovan fruit6. Belarusian contractors pur-
chase apples at a price slightly lower than the 
price previously paid by the Russians. According 
to data gathered by the European mission EU-
BAM, since the introduction of the fruit em-
bargo there has been a 24-fold increase in the 
volume of exports of Moldovan apples to Bela-
rus, whereas in the case of plums the increase 
has been six-fold7. Additionally, there has been 
a sharp increase in Moldovan exports to the Eu-
ropean Union (an increase of 16% in the period 
between January and August 2014), including, 
in particular, to Italy and Germany (an increase 
of 54% and 41% in the same period, respecti-
vely). As a result, despite the trade restrictions 
imposed by Russia the entire value of Moldo-
van exports rose in the first 8 months of 2014 
by 0.6% year-on-year, and the rate of econo-
mic growth in the first half of 2014 was 3.6%. 
According to experts of the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, trade restric-
tions imposed by Russia, as well as the unstable 
situation in the region, are likely to reduce Mol-
dova’s GDP by ca. 0.9% in 2014. This should be 
understood as a perceptible, albeit not a dra-
matic decrease.
6 http://newsmaker.md/rus/novosti/belorussiya-popa-
la-v-yablochko
7 http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1847992.html
The embargo imposed by Russia was expected 
to bring a drop in popular support for the cur-
rent government coalition in the upcoming par-
liamentary elections. On the one hand, it was 
intended to reduce the production output in 
the facilities subject to sanctions and to cause 
lay-offs, which would subsequently fuel social 
tensions. On the other hand, it is being used 
to present to Moldovan society the benefits of 
supporting pro-Russian political forces. In this 
context, a good example was provided by the 
lifting in March 2014 of the embargo on alco-
holic beverages imposed against the Autono-
mous Region of Gagauzia, a part of Moldova8. 
In the February 2014 referendum organised by 
local authorities and rejected by Chișinău the 
majority of Gagauzia’s residents expressed their 
support for Moldova to be integrated into the 
Customs Union promoted by Russia. It seems 
highly probable that in the upcoming months 
Gagauzian farmers will again be allowed to 
export their fruit to Russia9. 
The job market
Russia has for many years been the main desti-
nation for expatriate workers from Moldova. Ac-
cording to estimates, the current number of Mol-
dovans working in Russia is between ca. 300,000 
and 500,00010. This means that more than 50% 
of all Moldovan expatriate workers work in Rus-
sia. Each year expatriates transfer to Moldova 
ca. 1.6 billion US dollars11, which accounts for 
ca. 25% of Moldovan GDP. Up to two thirds of this 
sum comes from expatriates working in Russia.
8 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2014- 
04-02/russia-playing-harder-moldova
9 http://point.md/ru/novosti/ekonomika/moldavskie-eksperti- 
ubezhdeni-chto-rossiya-snimet-plodoovoschnoe-embargo- 
dlya-gagauzii
10 More on the issue of job migration from Moldova see: 
Kamil Całus, Migration between the EU, V4 and Eastern 
Europe: the present situation and possible future. The 
perspective of Moldova, [in:] Marta Jaroszewicz, Mag-
dalena Lesińska, Forecasting Migration Between EU, V4 
and Eastern Europe, OSW Report; http://www.osw.waw.
pl/sites/default/files/migration_report_0.pdf
11 Data after the National Bank of Moldova.
Most of Moldovan apples are still sold in 
the Russian market, just as they were be-
fore the embargo. This has been possible 
thanks to Belarusian intermediaries who 
issue Belarusian certificates of origin for 
Moldovan fruit.
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High-ranking Russian state officials have open-
ly signalled the possibility of using the issues 
associated with Moldovan expatriates working 
in Russia to exert pressure on Chișinău12. Since 
1 January 2014 Moldovans have been allowed 
to stay in Russia for only 90 days in six months. 
As a result of this decision, according to data 
compiled by the Russian Federal Migration 
Service, ca. 220,000 Moldovans working in 
Russia have stayed there illegally, because they 
have exceeded the 90-day period or do not 
have the relevant permits13. According to some 
sources, each day as many as 100 Moldovan ci-
tizens receive a decision prohibiting them from 
crossing the Russian border14. These restrictions 
have not impacted the overall economic situ-
ation of Moldovan society, however. Moreover, 
there has been a significant increase in the va-
lue of monetary transfers from Moldovan expa-
triate workers. According to figures compiled 
by the National Bank of Moldova, during the 
first 7 months of 2014 the total value of trans-
fers made by expatriate workers amounted to 
946.5 million US dollars, representing a 9% in-
crease over last year’s figures.
12 In May 2014 Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogoz-
in asked a rhetorical question: “Why would Russia maintain 
the current status quo [which enables Moldovans to work 
in Russia – author’s note], in the situation when Moldova 
(…) is just about to stop being a country which is friend-
ly or at least neutral towards Russia?”; http://www.mk.ru/
politics/2014/05/12/stremyascheysya-v-es-moldavii-napom-
nili-pro-gastarbayterov-i-vezhlivyih-lyudey.html
13 Russia’s ambassador to Moldova, Farid Muhamedshyn 
said in January 2014 that 245,000 Moldovans belong 
to the so called ‘risk group’; http://totul.md/ru/news-
item/439108.html
14 http://totul.md/ru/newsitem/563355.html
It seems highly unlikely that Russia could orga-
nise mass deportations of Moldovan expatriate 
workers. This type of operation would be extre-
mely complicated and contrary to Russia’s real 
interests – Moscow needs migrants, in particu-
lar those coming from European countries. The 
migration issue, however, will continue to be 
used for political purposes. It is very probable 
that spectacular deportations of small groups 
of Moldovan citizens will be organised and 
extensively covered by the media and further 
threats of closing the Russian job market for 
Moldovans will be announced.
The energy sector
Since 1991 Russia has been the exclusive sup-
plier of gas both for the part of Moldova lo-
cated on the right bank of the Dniester, which 
consumes ca. 1 billion m3 of gas per year, and 
for the breakaway region of Transnistria, whose 
annual gas consumption is ca. 2 billion m3. Gaz-
prom has been the majority shareholder (63.4% 
of shares) in the Moldovan company Moldova-
gaz responsible for gas purchase and distribu-
tion. Chișinău’s attempts at diversification of 
gas supplies by importing it from Romania have 
not brought measurable results so far15. The 
Ungheni–Iasi interconnector pipeline brought 
into operation on 27 August 2014, linking the 
Moldovan and Romanian gas transmission ne-
tworks, is not currently working. The reasons for 
this state of affairs include the objections raised 
by Moldovagaz, which has been blocking the si-
gning of the agreement for the distribution of 
gas purchased from Romania16. However, even if 
the agreement is ultimately signed, the pipeline 
will only be able to provide ca. 50 million m3 of 
15 More on the process of diversification of gas supplies 
to Moldova and related problems see: Kamil Całus, The 
Iasi-Ungheni pipeline: a means of achieving energy in-
dependence from Russia? Moldova’s attempts at gas 
supply diversification, OSW Commentary, 11.10.2013, 
http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commen-
tary/2013-10-11/iasi-ungheni-pipeline-a-means-achiev-
ing-energy-independence
16 http://unimedia.info/stiri/moldova-gaz-intarzie-func-
tionarea-gazoductului-iasi-ungheni-82018.html
It seems highly unlikely that Russia could 
organise mass deportations of Moldovan 
expatriate workers. This type of operation 
would be extremely complicated and con-
trary to Russia’s real interest – Moscow 
needs migrants, in particular those com-
ing from European countries.
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gas per year, i.e. a mere 5% of the demand in the 
part of the country located on the right bank of 
the Dniester. An increase in gas supplies can only 
be achieved after the construction of the pipe-
line from Ungheni to Chișinău (the capital con-
sumes over 50% of gas used in the right-bank 
part of the country) and the modernization of 
the transmission network on the Romanian side 
is finished. It is still unclear, however, when the 
modernization work and the construction of the 
new pipeline will be completed. In emergency 
situations there is a technical possibility of re-
ceiving gas supplies via the existing connections 
with the Ukrainian transmission network. In the-
ory, pursuant to the current bilateral agreement 
signed with Kyiv, in case of problems with Rus-
sian gas supplies Moldova is entitled to use the 
Ukrainian reserves stored in underground gas 
tanks in Bogorodchany. Considering the current 
condition of Russian-Ukrainian gas relations, 
though, it should be expected that Ukraine wo-
uld not make its reserves available to Chișinău.
The supplies of electricity to Moldova have also 
been dependent on Russia to a large extent. In 
Moldova there is only one large power plant 
– Moldavskaya GRES, but it is located in the 
territory of the separatist Transnistria and has 
been owned by the Russian state energy com-
pany INTER RAO UES since 2004. In 2013 its 
output covered 45% of Moldova’s demand17. 
Moreover, in right-bank Moldova there are cu-
rrently three combined heat and power plants 
in operation, which cover ca. 20% of the coun-
try’s demand. These plants are gas-fired which 
means that they too are dependent on Russia’s 
actions. Alternative supplies can be provided by 
the company DTEK Vostokenergo, a part of the 
Ukrainian enterprise DTEK Power Trade owned 
by Rinat Akhmetov. In 2013 it provided 35% of 
electricity imported to the Moldovan market. In 
theory, the company could be able to cover the 
entire demand of right-bank Moldova, should 
17 http://www.noi.md/ru/news_id/34631 and http://anre.md/
files/raport/Piata%20EE%2012%20luni%202013web.pdf
such a need arise. The security of energy sup-
plies from the Ukrainian company has recently 
been challenged by the conflict in eastern Ukra-
ine, though. Three power plants generating 
electricity which is subsequently exported to 
Moldova are located in the Donetsk oblast (in 
Zukhres and Kurakhov) and the Lugansk oblast 
(near Lugansk). Another problem lies in the fact 
that these power plants are coal-fired and the 
volume of coal extraction in Donbas has recen-
tly fallen considerably.
In the upcoming months Russia is likely to use 
Moldova’s dependence on it in the energy sec-
tor for political purposes. Chișinău has attemp-
ted, so far with no effect, to prolong the long- 
-term contract for the supply of gas which it 
had signed with Gazprom and which expired 
in 2011. The Russian gas company has made 
the signing of a new agreement conditional on 
Moldova’s resignation from the implementation 
of the so called Third Energy Package and from 
its membership of the Energy Community – de-
mands which have been rejected by Chișinău. 
As a consequence, the supplies of gas to Mol-
dova are being effected pursuant to the old 
contract which is gradually being prolonged for 
subsequent periods. The currently applicable 
prolonged contract is set to expire at the end 
of 201418. It cannot be ruled out that Russia will 
refuse to prolong the bilateral agreement once 
18 On 11 November 2014 Gazprom and Moldovagaz signed 
a new prolonged contract valid until the end of 2015. It 
was not discussed in this article, as work on the text was 
finished on 3 November. However, the prolongation does 
not render the threat of some form of Russian energy 
blackmail against Moldova less likely in the nearest future. 
The security of energy supplies from 
Ukraine has recently been challenged 
by the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Three 
power plants generating electricity which 
is subsequently exported to Moldova are 
located in the Donetsk oblast.
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again, which will cause a break in the supply of 
gas and a serious energy crisis, if no alternative 
supplies are organised. A pretext for refusing 
to sign the agreement could be Transnistria’s 
debt for unpaid gas supplies currently worth 
ca. 4 billion US dollars (Russia considers this 
debt to belong to Moldova) or the current 
ca. 500 million US dollars debt of right-bank Mol-
dova itself. Disruptions to power supplies, espe-
cially in winter, are also possible. The probability 
of such a scenario becoming true depends to 
a large extent on the result of the upcoming 
parliamentary elections.
The banking sector
In recent years there has been an increase in the 
Russian share in the Moldovan banking sector. 
Moldova’s three largest banks, which control 
ca. 55% of the country’s entire banking sector, 
are being gradually taken over or have already 
come under the control of Russian or Moldovan 
businessmen associated with the Kremlin. The si-
tuation is similar in smaller banks. As a consequ-
ence, in the first half of 2014 the share of fore-
ign capital in the Moldovan banking sector was 
76.4%19, of which ca. 80–90% was Russian ca-
pital. This means that ca. 70% of the Moldovan 
banking sector is controlled by Russian capital20.
19 http://agora.md/stiri/2600/sectorul-bancar-din-moldova- 
-cel-mai-atractiv-pentru-investitorii-straini--cu-cat-au-cres-
cut-plasamentele
20 http://ava.md/economics/025841-sturza-70-bankovskoi 
-sistemi-moldovi-prinadlezhit-rossiiskim-kompaniyam.html
Moldova’s largest bank, Moldindconbank, is 
controlled by Moldovan millionaire Veaceslav 
Platon, who is associated with Russia and per-
manently resides there. It seems that, at least 
since the beginning of 2013, Platon has been 
trying to gain control also over Moldova’s third 
largest bank – Victoriabank. This bank is most 
probably owned by Moldovan oligarch Vlad 
Plahotniuc21, who at the same time is the main 
sponsor and deputy leader of the Democratic 
Party (PDM)22, forming a part of the pro-Eu-
ropean coalition. Companies associated with 
Platon currently control up to 30% of shares 
in Victoriabank. Additionally, at the beginning 
of June 2014 a further 5% of the bank’s shares 
were purchased by the company Tirkom registe-
red in Transnistria and owned by Transnistrian 
millionaire Evgeniy Bayev. It can be estimated, 
then, that 35%–40% of the bank’s shares are 
currently owned by companies linked to Russia. 
The ownership structure of Moldova’s second 
largest bank, Moldagroindbank, has also been 
very unclear. In 2011 and 2013 the bank be-
came subject to attacks organised according to 
a scenario which was almost identical to that 
used in the case of Victoriabank. Although the-
re is no evidence of any connections between 
the entities which purchased the bank’s sha-
res and the specific oligarch, the characteristic 
mode of action and certain rumours suggest 
that, just as in the case of Victoriabank, it is Ve-
aceslav Platon standing behind the takeovers. 
At the same time, another part of the Moldovan 
banking sector falls within the sphere of interest 
21 Since October 2014 Moldovan banks have been required 
to disclose information concerning their shareholders. 
This, however, does not make it possible to find out ex-
actly who de facto controls the specific bank. Official 
shareholders are frequently just intermediaries, often 
informally associated with other companies or individu-
als. Information on the ownership structure in the Mol-
dovan banking sector presented in this text has been 
compiled taking into account these informal ties. 
22 At the end of 2011 and the beginning of 2012 Plahotniuc 
announced that he had sold all his shares in this bank. In 
fact, however, the companies which purchased his shares 
are associated with him or indirectly owned by him, 
which enables Plahotniuc to remain in control of them.
The effective control over the banking 
sector makes it possible to disrupt the 
flow of money transfers from expatriate 
workers and to slow down the investment 
process by limiting the investment lend-
ing activities, which may impact the rate 
of economic growth.
7OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 152
of Russian state companies which are trying to 
gain direct control over it. One example of such 
activity comes from Moldova’s ninth largest 
bank, Banca de Economii (BEM). In August 2013 
the Moldovan state, until then the bank’s majo-
rity shareholder, sold a large part of its shares, 
retaining only the 33.3% blocking package. The 
sold shares were purchased by Sisteme Informa-
tionale Inegrate, a Moldovan company with Rus-
sian capital, owned by Ilan Shor, an Israeli-born 
Moldovan-Russian millionaire. As a result of this 
transaction the company became the owner of 
33.73% of shares in BEM. Funds for the purcha-
se of the shares were most probably obtained 
from the Russian Gazprombank23. In April 2014 
the Russian state-owned company VEB Capital 
purchased 24.9% of BEM’s shares from Shor’s 
business. Additionally, tranches of from 3.7% 
up to 8.8% of shares are owned by seven other 
Russian companies. It is estimated that currently 
ca. 61% of BEM’s shares are controlled by Rus-
sian capital or individuals associated with it24. In 
the meantime, Ilan Shor has also gained control 
over Banca Sociala and most probably Unibank 
(ranked sixth and tenth on the list of Moldova’s 
largest banks, respectively).
The control of Russian capital over a key part of 
the Moldovan banking sector is being used by 
Russian companies for money laundering. Ac-
cording to Moldovan law enforcement bodies 
and the investigative journalist organization 
OCCRP, the above-mentioned Moldindconbank 
was involved in activities which enabled at least 
18 billion US dollars to be laundered between 
2010 and 201425. 
Russian influence in the Moldovan banking sec-
tor enables Moscow to, for example, speculate 
on the Moldovan currency and artificially lo-
wer its value. Since mid-2013 a persistent de-
23 http://www.noi.md/md/news_id/30899
24 This is confirmed by the election of Ilan Shor as Presi-
dent of the Board of Directors at BEM on 30 April 2014; 
http://www.pan.md/news/Predsedatelem-Banca-de-
Economii-izbran-Ilan-Shor/49507
25 https://reportingproject.net/the-russian-laundromat/
russian-laundromat.php
preciation of the Moldovan leu against major 
world currencies has been evident. In 2013 the 
leu lost 8.2% against the US dollar and 12.3% 
against the euro. According to data compiled 
by the National Bank of Moldova, one of the 
main reasons for the decrease in the leu’s value 
has been the drop in the availability of foreign 
currencies and the simultaneous high demand 
for these currencies, in particular on the part of 
banks controlled by Veaceslav Platon and Ilan 
Shor. For several months now these banks have 
been transferring large amounts of funds to ac-
counts run mainly by the Russian Gazprombank 
and Alfabank. It is estimated that an amount 
equal to ca. 10% of all funds deposited with 
Moldovan banks has been transferred to Russia 
in this way. Although the progressive decrease 
in the value of the leu against Western curren-
cies has been stopped thanks to an intervention 
by the National Bank of Moldova, these exam-
ples clearly illustrate the scenario according to 
which Moldovan banks can be used to destabi-
lise the economic situation in the country. 
The effective control over the banking sector 
makes it possible to disrupt the flow of money 
transfers from expatriate workers and to slow 
down the investment process by limiting invest-
ment lending activities, which may impact the 
rate of economic growth. Additionally, currency 
speculation makes it possible to inflate the pri-
ces of imported goods. It is not inconceivable 
that Russia will use its influence in the Moldo-
van banking sector to seriously destabilise it or 
even to cause a breakdown, which might have 
immense influence on the public mood and bo-
ost support for pro-Russian groups currently 
In the context of the ineffectiveness of 
Russian pressure put on Moldova it is not 
inconceivable that, in order to achieve its 
political goals towards Chișinău, Russia 
will decide to use measures of force.
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forming part of the opposition. This instrument 
might also be used to destabilise the situation 
and bring about a fall of the new government 
after the elections and the prospective victory 
of pro-European forces. 
Prospects
Economic pressure currently exerted by Russia 
on Moldova has proved ineffective and may be 
considered insufficient by the authorities in the 
Kremlin. Russia will most probably decide to ti-
ghten its trade restrictions and will try to limit the 
re-export of Moldovan goods via Belarus or Ab-
khazia. On 20 October 2014 the Russian sanitary 
inspection body introduced restrictions on im-
ports of fruit and vegetables from Belarus, which 
is likely to impact the Moldovan fruit farming sec-
tor26. Considering the minor effects of the sanc-
tions imposed so far, it seems that the influence 
of these actions on the process of implementing 
the Association Agreement by the authorities 
in Chișinău, and on the electoral preferences of 
Moldovan voters, will most probably be insigni-
ficant. Therefore, it can be expected that Rus-
sia will more frequently use other instruments 
for exerting economic pressure on Moldova, 
mainly in the area of banking sector control.
At the same time it should be emphasised that 
the effectiveness of Russia’s means of exerting 
economic pressure on Moldova has been decli-
26 www.fsvps.ru/fsvps/news/11311.html
ning in recent years. Russia’s role in the trade with 
Moldova has also diminished, and this process has 
been accelerated by trade restrictions imposed by 
Russia towards imports of goods from Moldova27. 
In spite of perceptible losses suffered as a result 
of the current embargo, the wine making sector 
was less affected than during a period of similar 
restrictions imposed by Russia in 2006. Moldova’s 
dependence on Russian gas supplies is expected 
to be reduced considerably within six years or so, 
on the condition that the Ungheni–Chișinău pipe-
line is constructed, the gas transmission network 
on the Romanian side is modernised and the Third 
Energy Package is implemented. The opening of 
new power transmission lines between Romania 
and Moldova, planned for 2015, will also redu-
ce the risk associated with power supplies from 
Transnistria and Ukraine. However, securing the 
banking system against destabilising actions and 
ensuring its transparency remains a necessity.
In the context of the ineffectiveness of Russian 
pressure put on Moldova it is not inconceiva-
ble that, in order to achieve its political goals 
towards Chișinău, Russia will decide to use me-
asures of force or repeat the Donbas scenario 
in Moldova after the prospective victory of pro
-European groups in the upcoming parliamen-
tary elections.
27 It is expected that should the trade restrictions imposed 
by Russia in 2014 be upheld, this country will no longer 
be ranked first, but second (after Romania) on the list of 
Moldova’s exports partners.
